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CREATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE "FAILSAFE" TRUST FOR NONRESIDENT
ALIENS
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years nonresident aliens (NRAs)' have increased steadily
the flow of foreign funds into United States markets.2 Several factors
have stimulated foreign investment in the United States. For example,
the United States provides the NRA with a secure situs for the
safekeeping of his assets.3 In addition to its political stability, the
United States provides the NRA with an economically secure business
and investment atmosphere. 4 In fact, the United States promotes
foreign investment by providing NRAs with significant tax incentives
and relatively free markets.' Thus, with the lure of high interest rates
I A nonresident alien is an individual who is neither a citizen nor a resident of
the United States. To be treated as a resident of the United States, an individual
must be a "lawful permanent resident of the United States at any time" during the
calendar year, or he must meet the substantial presence test. See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1)
(Supp. 11 1984).
2 Warren, Personal Trusts for Nonresident Aliens, 121 TR. & EST. 36 (Apr.
1982). For example, at the end of 1980, foreign direct investment in the United
States reached a total of $65.6 billion, and total foreign assets in the United States
rose by $61.1 billion to reach a total of $480.9 billion. PRICE-WATERHOUSE, Ac-
QUISITIONS IN THE U.S.A. 1, 3 (1982). By the end of 1984, foreign direct investment
in the United States reached a total of $159.6 billion, while total foreign assets in
the United States reached $886.4 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF. THE UNITED STATES 1986, 797 (106th ed. 1985).
3 Wyckoff, Protective U.S. and Offshore Trusts for Nonresident Alien Grantors,
42 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 47.01, at 47-2 (1984).
4 Id. NRAs have responded to significant economic factors, including the ap-
preciation of United States real estate, the continued devaluation of the United
States dollar, and the lower inflation rate in the United States relative to other
nations. Mene, Estate Planning for Nonresident Aliens, 59 TAxEs-THE TAx MAGAZINE
617-18 (Sept. 1981).
Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.01, at 47-3; see Note, Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States: Disclosure Regulations, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 193 (1982);
see generally Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539
(1966). Generally, by treating foreign capital on a basis of equality with domestic
capital, the United States Government does not impose limitations on foreign in-
vestment. A few sensitive areas, however, such as communications, coastal shipping,
and defense, maintain certain restrictions on ownership. PRICE-WATERHOUSE, supra
note 2, at 3.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
in the United States, the political unrest throughout parts of Central
and South America, and the possibility of further political upheavals
in the Middle East, NRAs have greatly accelerated the flow of foreign
funds into the United States. 6
The steadily increasing flow of foreign funds into the United States
has necessitated the structuring of various protective investment de-
vices to address the investment concerns of the NRA. The NRA who
invests in the United States has two primary concerns when structuring
an appropriate protective investment device. First, the NRA must
select an investment structure which will protect his assets against
both "home country" confiscation 7 and United States "freezing" or
"vesting. ' 8 Second, the NRA must select an investment device which
will preserve his United States investments during any confusion
resulting from a political emergency in his native country. 9
The NRA may choose from several types of protective investment
structures to prevent expropriation of United States assets by his
home country or "freezing" of these assets by the United States.10
6 Warren, supra note 2, at 36.
7 Knight, "Failsafe'" Legal Structures to Protect U.S. Assets of Foreign Investors,
9 INT'L Bus. LAW. 109 (1981). For example, the NRA may be concerned that a
new, revolutionary government could rise to power in his native country. This new
government may attempt to confiscate assets of citizens or residents of the country
or to force these nationals to liquidate their international investments and bring the
proceeds back to the native land. Under international law, however, United States
courts may refuse to give effect to the edict of a foreign government, "so long as
its refusal . . . is not arbitrary according to the rules of the conflict of laws of
states that have reasonably developed legal systems." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 9 (1965); see Dale, Protection of
Trust Assets, in FoREIGN TRUSTS IN INTERNATIONAL PLANNING 109, 112 (H. Dale
comp. 1974). Nevertheless, a protective investment device can serve as an effective
means of avoiding the confusion and costly litigation which might ensue from such
an edict. See Knight, supra, at 109.
1 Id. Political emergencies which potentially expose the NRA's assets to the risk
of confiscation by his home country or some other foreign country similarly may
evoke "freezing" or "vesting" orders by the United States Government. Even though
the NRA may avoid successfully the effects of foreign governmental actions, "freez-
ing" orders may hinder or prevent the NRA from utilizing his United States assets.
Id. at 110, 112-14.
9 Id. at 109-10. The NRA may not be able to leave his native country and come
to the United States to take care of his United States assets. Thus, he should make
arrangements to ensure that these assets will be managed properly during a political
emergency in his native country. Id.
10 For example, the NRA may choose to maintain his United States assets through
a holding company or a similar legal organization either within his home country
or in another "offshore" country. Such investment structures, however, do not
protect the NRA's assets from expropriation either by his home country or by the
"offshore" country. See id. at 110-11.
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Selection of the particular protective structure will depend upon the
individual needs and desires of the NRA as well as upon his particular
circumstances." Nevertheless, of the several types of protective in-
vestment devices available to the NRA, the "failsafe" trust offers
the best protection against nationalization by a foreign country or
"freezing" by the United States.
Similar in nature to other trust structures, the failsafe trust provides
the NRA with significant protection against expropriation and freez-
ing. The failsafe trust device employs a trustee based in the United
States or in another "safe" jurisdiction to hold legal title to trust
property. The role played by the trustee may vary with a change in
the beneficiaries of the trust or with the occurrence of a defined
political emergency.
12
Although the use of trusts in international estate and tax planning
has increased significantly in recent years, 3 several NRAs, especially
those domiciled in civil law countries, remain unaware that they may
secure their assets in failsafe trusts.14 These NRAs, however, should
be advised of failsafe trusts as investment structures since a well-
" Id. at 110. For a discussion of some of these considerations, see infra notes
100-01 and accompanying text.
,2 "A trust . .. is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting
the person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with
the property for the benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a
manifestation of an intention to create it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2
(1959). The "failsafe" trust is an investment device designed by W. Donald Knight,
a partner at the law firm of King & Spalding in Atlanta, Georgia. See Knight, supra
note 7, at 110.
,1 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUST AND TRUSTEES § 10 (2d ed. rev. 1984) [here-
inafter BOGERT]. The use of trusts as estate and tax planning devices has risen
significantly on the international level. Factors which have stimulated the interest
of NRAs include increased mobility among residents of various nations around the
world, greater opportunities for investment in the United States and abroad, and
increased efforts to garner wealth with minimal tax burdens to intended beneficiaries.
/d.
I1 Although most civil law countries do not expressly recognize the trust, some
jurisdictions, such as Scotland, Quebec, South Africa, and Sri Lanka, have accepted
the concept. Gold, Trust Funds in International Law: The Contribution of the
International Monetary Fund to a Code of Principles, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 856, 858
(1978). Nevertheless, the NRA must take note that an attempt to create a trust in
certain civil law countries may result in nonrecognition or even invalidity of the
trust. Newton, Selecting a Situs for a Foreign Trust: The Key Factors; How and
When to Change It, 59 J. TAX'N 220 (1983). For example, the French civil code
does not recognize the trust since its use is precluded by the concepts of community
property and forced heirship. Similarly, the concept of the trust is unknown in
Germany, where courts generally treat common law trusts as mere contractual
relationships. BOGERT, supra note 13, § 9.
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organized and well-managed trust can benefit the foreign investor in
several ways. Trusts are the most flexible investment planning devices,
providing immediate protection of assets for current use and long-
term protection of assets for minor children. 5 Although investors
traditionally utilize trusts to maintain stock and bond portfolios,
NRAs also may manage real estate, commodities, and other types of
assets through these investment devices.1 6 Furthermore, the trust pro-
vides the NRA with uninterrupted expert management of investments
in the United States.' 7 Thus, the trustee can make purchases and
sales, as circumstances dictate, without first obtaining approval by
the beneficiary. 8 Finally, the failsafe trust may provide anonymity
and secrecy as to ownership and disposition of assets. 9
This Note will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the
failsafe trust as an investment device for the NRA. Specifically, this
Note will suggest certain factors which the NRA must consider when
creating and administering the trust. Finally, the Note will evaluate
the effectiveness of the failsafe trust against potential United States
"freezing" or home country expropriation.
II. TRUST CREATION
A. The Trust Situs
Once the NRA has decided to establish a failsafe trust, 20 he must
determine whether to situate the device in the United States or in
11 Geller, Estate Planning Considerations for the Nonresident Alien's U.S. Situs
Assets, 121 TR. & EST. 28, 30 (Apr. 1982).
16 Warren, supra note 2, at 36.
17 Id.
I d.
9 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 10. Other advantages of the failsafe trust include:
(a) several tax benefits; (b) increased flexibility for movement of assets and/or situs;
(c) safety from political claims and creditors; (d) immunity from state inheritance
laws; (e) avoidance of probate administration after the settlor's death; and (f)
centralized control of assets with the assistance of professional management. Id.;
see Kanter, Some Reasons for Use of Irrevocable Common Law Trusts in Common
Law and Civil Law Countries, in FOREIGN TRUSTS IN INTERNATIONAL PLANNING 7,.
9-11 (H. Dale comp. 1974).
20 When creating the failsafe trust, the NRA should consider that the Internal
Revenue Code establishes the applicable standards for classifying the investment
structure as either a trust or as an association taxable as a corporation. Local law,
however, determines whether the legal relationships which result from the formation
of the structure are such that these standards are met. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-1(c)
(1986); see Duffy & Ferguson, The Use of Foreign Trusts, in FOREIGN TRUSTS IN
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another country. The NRA may find it difficult to select the proper
trust situs for his assets, and the Internal Revenue Code (Code) offers
little help to solve this dilemma. Although the Code defines a "foreign
trust, ' 2' this definition, when read with the Code's definition of a
"United States person," ' 22 does not assist in determining whether a
particular trust is a "foreign" or a "United States" trust.23 Internal
Revenue Service (Service) rulings and court cases, however, indicate
that several factors determine whether a court or the Service will
declare a trust to be foreign? 4 A trust normally is foreign if: (1) the
trustee is foreign; (2) the trust is administered outside the United
States; (3) the trust is formed by agreement or declaration which is
expressly governed by foreign law; (4) the trust instrument is executed
outside the United States; and (5) no discretionary agent or securities
or commodity broker is present in the United States.25
INTERNATIONAL PLANNING 35, 37 (H. Dale comp. 1974). For a structure to qualify
as a trust, the Internal Revenue Service requires that the trustee be responsible for
the protection of the assets belonging to beneficiaries who do not share in this
responsibility, as opposed to the centralized manager of an association whose objective
is to conduct business and divide the gains therefrom. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-4 (a)-
(b), 301.7701-2(a) (1)-(2) (1986); see Morrisey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); see
also Duffy & Ferguson, supra, at 37.
2, "The terms 'foreign estate' and 'foreign trust' mean an estate or trust, as the
case may be, the income of which, from sources without the United States which
is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States, is not includible in gross income under subtitle A." 126 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(31)
(1982); see also Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.02, at 47-7.
22 "The term 'United States person' means [:] (A) a citizen or resident of the
United States, (B) a domestic partnership, (C) a domestic corporation, and (D) any
estate or trust (other than a foreign estate or foreign trust, within the meaning of
section 7701(a)(31))." 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(30)(1) (1982); see also Wyckoff, supra
note 3, § 47.02, at 47-7.
23 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.02, at 47-7.
2- See Rev. Rul. 62-154, 1962-2 C.B. 148 (whether the estate of a nonresident
alien decedent is a resident or nonresident alien entity of the United States for
federal income tax purposes depends upon all of the facts involved). See generally
Rev. Rul. 65-311, 1965-2 C.B. 322 (determination of whether a United States cor-
poration should withhold tax from dividends paid to an alien estate depends upon
all of the facts involved).
2 Duffy & Ferguson, supra note 20, at 39. Thus, "[a]n employees' trust created
in Canada that operates exclusively in the U.S. for the benefit of U.S. employees
of a Canadian organization doing business in the U.S. and subject to continuous
U.S. jurisdiction is a domestic trust." Rev. Rul. 70-242, 1970-1 C.B. 89. Furthermore,
[wihere the property of a trust, established under the laws of a foreign
jurisdiction, consists principally of securities of United States corporations
and such securities are held, controlled, and traded in the United States
on a domestic exchange by a trustee who is a citizen and resident of this
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1. The United States-Situs Trust
The NRA may determine that a United States trust would serve
best his investment needs. 26 By organizing a trust in the United States,
the NRA may enjoy many of the same advantages that a United
States citizen enjoys for his own trust. 27 For example, by selecting a
custodian bank to oversee the trust, the NRA has access to profes-
sional, confidential, and secure investment management. 28 By pro-
viding continued management and experienced judgment, the trust
structure also increases the effectiveness of a power of attorney in
the event of the NRA grantor's disability. 29 Furthermore, the trust,
in certain circumstances, may serve as a significant barrier against
enforcement of the claims of a creditor. 30
Another advantage of the United States-situs trust is that the NRA
grantor may retain the freedom to remove the trustee, transfer the
trust situs and assets to another state or country, control the in-
vestment, or revoke the trust entirely.31 Consequently, in certain
country, the trust is deemed to be a resident alien entity of the United
States for Federal Income tax purposes.
Rev. Rul. 60-181, 1960-1 C.B. 257.
26 A United States-situs trust is a trust which is situated in any state within the
United States. Hendrickson, American Trusts for Nonresident Aliens, 123 TR. &
EST. 40 (Feb. 1984).
27 Id. "A properly drawn and managed revocable, conditionally revocable, or
irrevocable trust situated in an American island tax haven like Manhattan can retain
for a non-American most of the same 'tax-haven' advantages that trusts in those
other island paradises enjoy - except summery winters and coconut palms - without
worrying about Cuba." Id.
21 The bank's duties may include: (1) prompt execution of orders for trades; (2)
exercise of options; (3) collection of dividends and interest; (4) issuance of tax return
information and periodic statements to appropriate parties; (5) payment of bills;
and (6) distributions to beneficiaries. Id. at 42-44.
9 For a more detailed discussion concerning disability of the grantor, see infra
note 89 and accompanying text.
30 Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 42. Although property held in a revocable trust
generally is subject to claims of the grantor's creditors, a revocable trust can impede
enforcement of such claims if the terms of the trust provide that the trust is revocable
only with the consent of a disinterested cotrustee or of a similar party. Id.
I, Id. Although the NRA may establish a trust device which will allow him to
retain control over the trust, he should consider that some trusts do not offer the
grantor total control over the trust assets. Generally, however, a revocable trust
offers the grantor significant control over the trust. See infra notes 64-73 and
accompanying text. A conditionally revocable trust offers the grantor limited control
over the trust. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. An irrevocable trust,
however, offers the grantor no control over the trust. See infra notes 93-113 and
accompanying text. Ultimately, the NRA must evaluate his individual situation before
deciding upon a trust structure. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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circumstances, the trust may serve as a will substitute following the
death of the NRA grantor.3 2 Furthermore, in the absence of applicable
treaty provisions, a United States court generally will not enforce the
tax claims of a foreign government against trust assets or claims
under exchange control revenue laws of a foreign government.33 In
addition, following the grantor's death the United States-situs trust
may continue for the maximum period allowed by the rule against
perpetuities34 or, if the trust is for charitable purposes, for perpetuity.35
The trust structure also provides the NRA with certain tax advan-
tages. For example, the Service imposes upon the trust no federal,
state, or local income, capital gain, or personal property taxes if the
trust consists of assets which are "not effectively connected with the
conduct of a trade or business within the United States. ' 3 6 Thus,
although the trust may maintain some United States-situs assets, the
level of actual United States tax liability remains at a desired min-
imum. 3 7 Furthermore, the Service levies no withholding tax on re-
mittances to a domestic United States trust from United States sources,
such as dividends from United States corporate issuers. Therefore,
32 Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 42. The trust is in many ways superior to a
will. The trust protects the grantor's assets from probate costs and claims of creditors
arising after the grantor's death. The trust file also remains completely confidential
when transferred to the successor, as the assets are not subject to the publicity which
often surrounds probate, succession, and notarial procedures. Furthermore, the trust
is more difficult than a will for a disgruntled heir to attack and contest, and the
grantor can limit or perhaps even eliminate his surviving spouse's claims to all or
to an elective share of his trust assets. Id.
11 Id. A state may refuse to enforce penal or fiscal claims of a foreign state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 89, 117, 120 (1971); see United
States v. Harden, 1963 S.C.R. 366 (Canada refused to enforce a United States tax
court judgment).
31 "The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of a future contingent
interest unless, by the terms of its creation, the interest must vest within a life or
lives in being, and twenty-one years thereafter." TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY 142 (3d ed. abr. 1970).
31 Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 42.
36 26 U.S.C. § 861 (1982); see generally 26 U.S.C. § 862 (1982).
37 The revocable United States-situs trust can avoid United States estate and gift
taxation of assets by exchanging United States-situs property for stock of a controlled
or closely held foreign corporation. Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 42-43. But see
Fillman v. United States, 355 F.2d 632 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (since every action which
foreign corporations took with respect to securities was performed in the capacity
of a mere custodian and depositer for the NRA, the securities held in custody
accounts in the United States in the names of the foreign corporations at the time
of the NRA's death were includible in the NRA's estate for federal estate tax
purposes as having been owned by the NRA). Id.
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the trustee of the United States-situs trust may receive the entire
amount of the remittance.38
A further advantage of the United States-situs trust is its flexibility
as an investment device. The NRA may appoint himself as the sole
trustee of the trust's assets,39 or he has the option of appointing a
United States bank or another trustworthy individual as trustee or
cotrustee. 4° Moreover, the NRA grantor may choose to retain the
power to change the trustee or to accord the power to change the
trustee to another.41 Finally, the United States-situs trust can be
completely irrevocable; 42 completely revocable4a by the grantor, the
trustee, or some other person; or conditionally revocable44 by the
grantor with the consent of the trustee-or another.45
The United States-situs trust, however, does have certain disad-
vantages. The attachment of Iranian assets during the Iranian crisis
of the early 1980's indicates that although the United States offers
an attractive location for foreign investment, 46 assets situated in United
States-situs trusts are vulnerable to "freezing" by the United States
or expropriation by another country.4 7 In addition to potential "vest-
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.441-3(f) (1960), reprinted in Henderson, supra note 26, at 43.
The trustee, however, must pay withholding tax when the trust distributes these
dividends to the beneficiaries. Id.
19 Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 43.
4o Id.
" For a more detailed discussion concerning changing the trustee of the trust,
see infra notes 139-59 and accompanying text. The trustee of a United States-situs
trust need not be a citizen or resident of the United States; nor must the trustee
be a citizen or resident of the country in which the trust assets are kept. Hendrickson,
supra note 26, at 43.
42 For a detailed discussion of irrevocable trusts, see infra notes 93-113 and
accompanying text.
41 For a detailed discussion of revocable trusts, see infra notes 64-85 and accom-
panying text.
" For a detailed discussion of conditionally revocable trusts, see infra notes 86-
92 and accompanying text.
41 Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 44. "Of all the states of the United States,
the one whose law is most highly developed in these matters is New York. The
direction of its development has been to provide a hospitable, protective, and tax-
sheltered legal environment for trusts established by nonresidents of New York."
Id. at 40; see also Hendrickson, Choice-of-Law Directions for Disposing of Assets
Situated Elsewhere than the Domicile of Their Owner - The Refractions of Renard,
18 REA PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 407 (1983).
41 For a discussion of the advantages of the United States for foreign investment,
see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
47 Following the fall of the Imperial Shah of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini
renounced all transactions with United States industry. As a result of Khomeini's
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ing" or "freezing orders," other disadvantages of a United States-
situs trust include the possibilities of less confidentiality than that
found in a foreign-situs trust8 and the imposition of a generation
skipping tax49 which would not be applicable to a foreign-situs trust.50
2. The Foreign-Situs Trust
Depending upon certain individual circumstances, the NRA may
desire to establish a trust device in a foreign jurisdiction. Perhaps
the greatest advantage of the foreign-situs trust lies with the estab-
lishment of the trust under the laws of a "tax haven" jurisdiction. 5'
The NRA, however, still may choose to maintain custody of the trust
securities in the United States or in a similarly secure jurisdiction,
such as Switzerland, rather than at the tax shelter situs.5 2 By main-
taining the trust securities in a secure jurisdiction, the NRA receives
maximum protection against expropriation and nationalization by the
NRA's home country as well as by the "tax haven" situs.5 3
A trust device situated outside the United States also benefits from
certain United States tax advantages. The Service treats a foreign
trust as an NRA not engaged in a trade or business within the United
actions, United States corporations found themselves with expropriation and breach
of contract claims estimated at approximately eight billion dollars. See Marks &
Grabow, The Presidents Foreign Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan:
Legislation by Acquiescence, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 68, 70 (1982). Seeking to recover
on claims against Iran, United States corporations rushed to locate and attach any
and all Iranian assets located in the United States. The United States courts awarded
several of these corporations prejudgment attachment of Iranian property situated
in the United States. Id. at 71. See Mayer & Odorizzi, Foreign Government Deposits:
Attachment and Set-Off, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 289. Furthermore, the Trading with
the Enemy Act empowers the President to attack and secure foreign-owned assets
held within the United States in the occurrence of a declared national emergency.
See Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982); see also International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1982). The constitutionality
of these acts is supported by Unindyne Corp. v. Iran, 512 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Va.
1981).
4' Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.03, at 47-19.
41 For a detailed discussion of the generation skipping tax, see infra notes 76-78
and accompanying text.
50 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.03, at 47-19.
11 A "tax haven" jurisdiction is one which imposes very little or no tax on income
which the trust receives from sources outside the jurisdiction or on distributions of
such income to the beneficiaries of the trust. Warren, supra note 2, at 36.
52 Id.
5 Id. For a discussion of the possible "freezing" or vesting of trust assets, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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States.14 Consequently, the Service taxes the gross amount of interest,
dividends, and other fixed or determinable income at a thirty percent
statutory rate or at the applicable treaty rate.5 Furthermore, the
capital gains of a trust are not subject to United States federal income
tax, provided the trust is not "present" in the United States "for a
period or periods aggregating 183 days or more during the taxable
year." 56
Like the United States-situs trust, the foreign-situs trust does have
disadvantages and administrative problems. For example, when cre-
ating a foreign-situs trust, the NRA may find it difficult to ensure
that the beneficiaries of the trust receive adequate monthly principal
and income statements.17 The NRA may encounter further difficulties
in finding a United States-based nominee to hold trust securities for
a foreign-situs trust 8.5 Finally, complicated forms, computations, and
record-keeping requirements create complexities which may necessitate
the use of an experienced corporate fiduciary to manage the foreign-
situs trust.5 9
When establishing the foreign-situs trust, the NRA must select
carefully the proper situs for the trust. As the trust is not recognized
in civil law countries, 60 the situs of the trust necessarily is limited to
common law countries. The NRA also must be cognizant of the local
perpetuities and accumulation rules of the country in which he desires
to establish a trust. 61 Furthermore, the NRA should seek to establish
5 See Kroll, Special Problems of Foreign Trusts, in THE FOREIGN TRUST: USES
AND LIMITATIONS 69, 71 (H. Dale comp. 1973).
" 26 U.S.C. §§ 641(a), 871(a)(1) (1982). The term nonresident alien individual
includes a nonresident alien fiduciary. 26 C.F.R. § 1.871-2(a) (1986). The applicable
treaty rate applies only to the NRA's gross income, the tax on which is limited by
a tax convention. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.871-12(a) (1986).
S6 26 U.S.C. § 871(a)(2) (1982). "[Glains and losses shall be taken into account
only if, and to the extent that, they would be recognized and taken into account
if such gains and losses were effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or
business within the United States . . ." Id. See also Kroll, supra note 54, at 71.
57 Bush, The Foreign Trust - Drafting and Administering, in THE FOREIGN TRUST:
USES AND LIMITATIONS 111, 118 (H. Dale comp. 1973).
51 Id. at 119.
59 Id. at 118; see Barnett, Advising Clients on Record-Keeping for Calculation
of Throwback Distributions, 5 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 71.1100-71.(14) (1971).
60 For a discussion concerning the effectiveness of trusts in civil law countries,
see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
61 Bush, supra note 57 at 111. For example, accumulation trusts in Hong Kong
generally are subject to more restrictions than are trusts in other countries. In Hong
Kong accumulation can be continued only for one of four alternative periods: (1)
the life of the grantor; (2) 21 years from the death of the grantor; (3) the minority
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his trust in a nation which imposes minimal tax burdens. 62 Other
significant factors which the NRA should consider include: (1) free-
dom from currency controls; (2) political, economic, and social sta-
bility; (3) a fast, accurate communications network; (4) the availability
of competent trustees; and (5) trust laws, or the potential enactment
of trust laws, which may conflict with the trustee's right to administer
his dispositive trust device. 63
B. Revocable, Conditionally Revocable, and Irrevocable Trusts
In addition to deciding upon the situs of the failsafe trust, the
NRA must determine whether a "revocable" or "irrevocable" trust
will serve best his investment needs. Depending upon individual cir-
cumstances, however, the NRA may conclude that a "conditionally
revocable" trust will suit best these needs. Each of these three trust
structures presents significant benefits and drawbacks for the NRA.
1. The Revocable Trust
A revocable trust6 may serve the NRA as an effective and secure
investment device. A grantor creates a revocable trust by transferring
property to a trust for the benefit of at least one other person, while
reserving the power to revoke the trust in whole or in part at any
time.65 The grantor's reservation postpones the beneficiary's complete
of any person living at the death of the grantor; and (4) the minority of anyone
who under the terms of the trust would be entitled to the income to be accumulated
if of full age. Id. In the Cayman Islands, however, an "exempted trust" is allowed
to exist for any specified period up to 100 years. Id. at 112.
62 The countries which impose the least tax burdens include the Bahamas, Ber-
muda, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Norfolk Island, and New Hebrides. Id.
63 Id. at 111-13, 116. "Factors which lead to placing situs within a particular
jurisdiction are typically dynamic, not static. They vary with time and so it may
become necessary to ... [move the trust situs] to a new jurisdiction." Newton,
supra note 14, at 220.
6 "Revocation is the resumption by the settlor of possession and title to the
trust property, free of any obligation to the beneficiaries." BOGERT, supra note 13,
§ 998 (2d ed. rev. 1983).
65 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 (1959).
The grantor may reserve expressly within the trust agreement a power
to revoke the trust in whole or in part. Generally, a court will interpret a
power to revoke the trust as inherently including a power to revoke the
trust in part by withdrawing a part of the trust property from the trust.
The trust instrument, however, may provide expressly that the grantor may
revoke the trust only as a whole or as an entirety.
Id. § 330 at comment n.
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enjoyment of the trust property until after the grantor's death. 66
The revocable trust provides the NRA with more freedom to control
his assets than do most other investment structures. For example,
when creating the revocable trust, the grantor may name himself as
sole trustee and beneficiary for life while still maintaining the power
to end or alter the trust arrangement at any time.67 Although this
type of trust agreement closely resembles a testamentary disposition,
the revocable trust is more advantageous for the NRA than is a will.
While any disposition which can be made through a will also can be
made through a revocable trust, 6 the trust is not subject to potentially
bothersome and expensive probate proceedings. 69 Thus, the revocable
trust avoids the publicity and costs which may accompany a probate
proceeding . 70
The revocable trust also benefits the NRA in other ways. Through
the creation of a revocable trust, the NRA ensures the trustee's
continuous management of his investments uninterrupted by the gran-
tor's death. 7' In addition, the revocable trust preserves the trust assets
for the grantor for life and may determine who shall receive the
66 E. CARR, REVOCABLE TRUSTS 6 (1980). A revocable trust is amendable and
revocable by the grantor only. Upon revocation of the trust, the trust assets are to
be returned to the grantor unless he arranges otherwise. A. CASNER, TIlE REVOCABLE
TRUST: AN ESSENTIAL TOOL FOR THE PRACTICING LAWYER 1-2 (1977).
67 E. CARR, supra note 66, at 6. If the grantor names himself as sole trustee, he
should designate as well a successor trustee to assume the office upon his death.
Nevertheless, if the grantor fails to name a successor trustee, a court having juris-
diction in trust matters will appoint a successor to the office. Id.
" Id. For example, the grantor may provide expressly within the trust agreement
that at his death the trust shall continue for his spouse or for the benefit of one
or more designated persons with the distribution at their respective deaths to their
children and descendants. Id. The rule against perpetuities allows the trust to continue
for more than 100 years, even after it becomes irrevocable, and if the trust is
sufficiently charitable in purpose or sufficiently revocable, it could continue ad
infinitum. Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 42.
69 E. CARR, supra note 66, at 36.
1o Id. To avoid probate proceedings, the grantor must take care not to retain,
either intentionally or inadvertently, the entire beneficial interest in the trust property.
Therefore, when creating the trust, the grantor must make a present gift of an
equitable interest to at least one beneficiary, even though the grantor may postpone
until a later time the beneficiary's enjoyment of the gift. Id. at 29.
71 Since the NRA's investments will not pass through probate proceedings at the
grantor's death, the trustee continues to have full, uninterrupted authority over the
trust until the trust agreement expires. Although the NRA can arrange for someone
to manage his investments for an uninterrupted period without creating a revocable
trust, the revocable trust is often more efficient and inexpensive than other investment
structures. See id. at 51.
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benefits of the trust upon the death of the grantor. Thus, through
the creation of a revocable trust, the NRA grantor could prevent his
surviving spouse from receiving upon his death marital property that
she otherwise would have received absent the trust's creation.7 2 Finally,
the revocable trust is a "noncourt" trust in that it is not supervised
continuously by the court. Therefore, the NRA receives even more
freedom and privacy in the maintenance of his trust. 73
Before creating a revocable trust, the NRA should consider the tax
consequences of this investment structure. If the grantor retains a
power of revocation, the Service will tax him during his lifetime as
if the trust does not exist.7 4 Upon his death, however, the trust income
will be subject to federal estate tax in the same way as the income
of other trusts. 75 The generation skipping tax76 also may affect the
revocable trust upon or after the grantor's death. 77 Depending upon
the particular circumstances, the so-called generation skipping trust
may invoke a tax upon certain distributions that are made from the
72 Id. at 52; see Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945) (a
wife's right to renounce her husband's will did not extend to personal property
which the husband had conveyed during his lifetime, even though the sole purpose
of the trust in question was to disinherit the wife). But see Newman v. Dore, 275
N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) (holding in favor of a widow's claim to property
held in a revocable trust when the grantor transferred all of his property to various
revocable trusts only three days before his death). Furthermore, some states have
statutes which protect the rights of a surviving spouse. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §
474.150 (Vernon 1956) (surviving spouse may recover gifts in fraud of marital rights).
71 E. CARR, supra note 66, at 59. "[Ulnlike a trust that is established by will,
* . . [a revocable trust] is not under the jurisdiction of any court . . . unless the
trustee or beneficiary brings it into the court for the settlement of some trust matter.
Even then, when the particular matter is settled, the court generally will not retain
jurisdiction." Id. Furthermore, the revocable trust avoids judicial settlement of the
trustee's accounts, thereby saving .the beneficiaries' expense without endangering their
interests in the trust. Id. at 59-60.
- 26 U.S.C. § 2038 (1982).
71 Id.; Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949) (holding that the Service
properly included the value of the trust corpus in the grantor's gross estate when
the grantor reserved a life estate for himself); see also E. CARR, supra note 66, at
73. The trust is subject to estate tax even where the grantor retains no beneficial
interest for himself.
76 See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 2601-22 (1982). The generation skipping tax is
invoked when the grantor creates his trust for a younger generation beneficiary and
provides that when that beneficiary's interest is terminated, the trust rights shall
transfer to a still younger generation beneficiary. For example, the tax applies where
a parent leaves his estate in trust for his child for life with a remainder to his
grandchild. E. CARR, supra note 66, at 123; see 26 U.S.C. § 2611 (1982).
11 E. CARR, supra note 66, at 122-67.
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principal of the trust as it continues and upon the final distribution
following termination of the trust.78
Although the revocable trust has certain tax disadvantages, it also
offers the NRA several tax benefits. Unless the grantor relinquishes
the power to revoke the trust, the revocable trust is not subject to
federal gift tax.7 9 Thus, by partially revoking the trust, the grantor
may bestow gifts that are not subject to a gift tax.8 0 Moreover, so
long as the grantor is an NRA, no gift tax is invoked, even though
the donees of such gifts may be United States citizens. 8'
When creating a revocable trust, the grantor must reserve specif-
ically the power to revoke or amend the trust.8 2 If the draftsman
neglects to reserve this power expressly within the trust agreement,
a court may hold the trust to be irrevocable and, under certain
circumstances, may terminate the trust.83 Furthermore, the trust agree-
ment should provide expressly for the method of revocation and for
the time when the revocation is to take effect.8 4 A court, however,
71 Id. The generation skipping trust invokes the tax if the grantor is the initial
beneficiary for life of the trust and if the trust is to continue after his death for
the benefit of others. See id. at 123.
79 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (1982); Burnett v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) (gift
tax does not become payable until the powers to amend or revoke the trust are
released).
ao Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 41.
8, See 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(2) (1982). The tax is not invoked as long as the trust
property is located outside the United States. Id. § 2511(a).
12 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 1061 (2d ed. 1969). "(1) The settlor has the power
to revoke the trust if and to the extent that by the terms of the trust he reserved
such a power, (2) [T]he settlor cannot revoke the trust if by the terms of the trust
he did not reserve a power of revocation." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §
330 (1959). "The phrase 'terms of the trust' means the manifestation of intention
of the settlor with respect to the trust expressed in a manner which admits of its
proof in judicial proceedings." Id. § 220 at comment a.
83 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 998 (2d ed. rev. 1983). If both the grantor and the
trustee intended to insert a power of revocation within the trust instrument, and
the provision for revocation was mistakenly omitted from the instrument, a court
may either set aside the trust or insert a power of revocation in it. Id.; see McFarland
v. Bishop, 282 Mo. 534, 222 S.W. 143 (1920) (court refused to reform trust instrument
to insert power of revocation where grantor mistakenly failed to include such power
but had intended to use it for an illegal purpose).
84 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 1061 (2d ed. 1969). Such a provision may be worded
as follows:
I reserve the right to amend or revoke this trust in whole or in part at
any time and from time to time but only by written instrument delivered
to Trustee in my lifetime; except that the duties, powers, and liabilities of
Trustee shall not be changed without its written consent. Trustee shall
deliver to me or my nominee, absolutely and free of trust, any policies or
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probably will not invalidate the trust agreement if such provisions
are absent.8 5
2. The Conditionally Revocable Trust
If the NRA decides that the revocable trust does not meet his
investment needs, he may prefer to create a "conditionally revocable"
trust. The conditionally revocable trust is similar to the revocable
trust in all respects, 86 except the grantor of the conditionally revocable
trust may not revoke or amend the trust without the consent of a
disinterested cotrustee or some other designated person. 87 Although
it offers the same advantages as the revocable trust,88 the conditionally
revocable trust offers the NRA three additional advantages.
One additional advantage of the conditionally revocable trust is
that since the grantor cannot revoke the trust without the consent
of another, he is restrained from exercising improvidently his power
of revocation. 9 Another advantage of the conditionally revocable
trust is that the trustee's fiduciary duty to the trust's beneficiaries
obligates him to refuse to consent to revocation, if revocation would
other assets as I may direct in writing from time to time.
Id. § 1062. An example of a written revocation of a trust may read as follows:
I ... do hereby absolutely cancel and revoke all of the conditions,
convenants and provisions of said trust agreement and do hereby recall
unto myself all of the property now being held by the Trustee pursuant to
the terms of said trust agreement and direct that the Trustee convey, transfer,
assign and deliver all of such property to me ...
I do hereby declare that all property now being held by Trustee pursuant
to the terms of the aforesaid trust agreement shall be fully released from
the trusts created thereby.
Id. § 1075.
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 (1959). If the grantor does not
specify within the instrument the mode of revocation, he may revoke the trust "in
any manner which sufficiently manifests the intention of the ... [grantor] to revoke
the trust." Generally, the grantor will communicate to the trustee his decision that
the trust be revoked. However, any definite manifestation by the grantor of his
intent to revoke the trust will suffice, even though the trustee may not have received
this manifestation. See id. § 330 at comment i.
86 For a detailed discussion of revocable trusts, see supra notes 64-85 and ac-
companying text.
8' Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 40.
,' For a detailed discussion of the advantages of revocable trusts, see supra notes
67-73 and accompanying text.
1, Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 44. Thus, the trust assets are kept intact if the
grantor seeks revocation while he is under "mental stress, undue influence, torture,
duress, or the influence of alcohol or drugs, or of a gigolo or fortune hunter or
golddigger, or governmental edict." Id.
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not be in the best interests of the beneficiaries. In this manner the
trustee can protect the trust property from enforcement of claims of
the grantor's creditors. 90 Finally, the conditionally revocable trust is
advantageous in that several foreign countries may treat the condi-
tionally revocable trust as an absolute disposition of the trust property
by the grantor. 9' Thus, the tax authorities of these countries may
regard the income generated from the trust assets as not vested in
the grantor, not subject to his control, and, therefore, not taxable
to him. 92 These three additional advantages of the conditionally rev-
ocable trust give the NRA grantor of such a trust the best protection
against home country expropriation and United States vesting.
3. The Irrevocable Trust
The NRA's third option is creating an "irrevocable" trust. Unlike
the revocable and conditionally revocable trusts, the grantor of an
irrevocable trust does not retain the right to revoke or amend the
trust. 93 In creating an irrevocable trust, the NRA may choose from
a variety of methods. First, the grantor may provide expressly within
the trust agreement that the trust is irrevocable. 94 In addition, a
revocable trust generally becomes irrevocable upon the death or in-
capacity of the grantor. 95 Finally, when a trust is not created in
9 Id.
1, Id. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom treat the conditionally revocable
trust in a similar manner as a revocable trust. Id.
92 See id. In the United States the Service ignores the conditionality of the grantor's
power of revocation and instead regards the power to revoke as unfettered and
absolute. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 676 (1982); 26 C.F.R. § 1.676(a)-i (1986); United
States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1984) (the mere existence of a taxpayer's
power to control distribution of trust income and trust assets was sufficient to
warrant treating the taxpayer as the owner of portion of the trust).
93 W. BEHRENFIELD, ESTATE PLANNING DESK BOOK 232 (1981).
91 Such a provision may be worded as follows: "This trust shall be irrevocable
and I shall have no right to alter, amend, revoke or terminate this trust or any
provision hereof." BOGERT, supra note 13, § 1095 (2d ed. 1969). Another such
provision may be worded as follows: "I hereby declare this trust to be irrevocable
without any rights reserved in me to revoke or amend." Id. § 1096.
91 Id. § 1091. To ensure that the trust will become irrevocable upon his death
or incapacity, the grantor may provide expressly within the trust agreement that
such a transition is to occur upon his death or incapacity. Such a provision may
be worded as follows:
Upon my death, resignation (without my appointment of another as
trustee), or inability to act (as that term is hereinafter defined) as trustee,
I name, as the trustee hereunder, and my successor as trustee shall have
all of the powers and discretions herein given the trustee without conveyance
or transfer.
Id. § 1071.
1987] FAILSAFE TRUST FOR NONRESIDENT ALIENS
writing, 96 a court often will presume that the trust is irrevocable,
even though the grantor may have received no consideration for
creating the trust. 97 A party, however, may rebut this presumption
with evidence establishing that the grantor desired at the time of the
trust's creation to reserve a power of revocation, although he did
not reserve expressly such power. 9
Since the grantor of an irrevocable trust cannot exercise any power
over the trust once it is created,9 the NRA who wishes to establish
an irrevocable trust should evaluate several emotional and factual
considerations prior to the creation of the trust. For example, the
grantor should consider whether he can afford to part permanently
with the funds to be deposited in the trust.1m° Further, the grantor
Resulting and constructive trusts are enforceable even if they are not evidenced
by a written instrument. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 406 comment a, § 40
comment d (1959). "A resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes to be
made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that
he does not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the
beneficial interest therein .... ." Id. § 404.
A constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property subjecting the person
by whom the title to the property is held to an equitable duty to convey it to another
on the ground that his acquisition or retention of the property is wrongful and that
he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain the property. Id. § 1
at comment e.
1 See id. § 330 comment c (1959). Among the relevant factors which may be
significant in determining whether the grantor intended to reserve a power to revoke
the trust are: (1) the relationship between the grantor and the beneficiary; (2) the
grantor's purpose in creating the trust; (3) whether the grantor informed the ben-
eficiary of the creation of the trust; (4) the character of the trust property; (5) the
effect that the power of revocation would have upon the liability of the grantor of
his estate for taxes; and (6) the fact that the creation of the trust without the power
of revocation would be an unwise act on the part of the grantor. Id.
9s See id. Cf. Liberty Trust Co. v. Weber, 200 Md. 491, 90 A.2d 194 (1952)(statements of the grantor that at the time of trust creation he believed that he had
retained the power to revoke it does not alone suffice to reform the instruments so
as to permit him to revoke the trust).
" Once he has created the irrevocable trust, the grantor cannot dissolve it until
he establishes at least one of the following: (1) incompetence or mistake of the
grantor or fraud or deception used upon him at the inception of the trust; (2) terms
of the trust which are illegal or impossible to fulfill; (3) a merger of the legal and
equitable interests; or (4) the consent of all of the beneficiaries of the trust. Fur-
thermore, the court must determine that no material purpose of the grantor is
impaired substantially by the termination. Sargent, Should a Trust be Irrevocable?
4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 176 (1969).
,00 Id. One attorney has proposed a test consisting of two questions which he asks
clients before drafting irrevocable trusts for them: (1) Would you do the same thing
if it did not save you any money in taxes ... [and] (2) Can you take the calculated
risk that under no set of conceivable circumstances will you need these funds for
the period of the trust? Unless both questions are answered in the affirmative, the
attorney refuses to draft the irrevocable trust for his clients. Id. § 178.
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must evaluate his confidence in the trustee, his satisfaction with the
situs of the trust, and his comfort with the beneficiaries of the trust.
The grantor also may find it advantageous to assess the likelihood
that he will survive the designated beneficiaries. Finally, the grantor
should consider his alternatives to creating an irrevocable trust.'0
The grantor of the irrevocable trust benefits from many of the
same advantages enjoyed by grantors of revocable 0 2 and conditionally
revocable'0 3 trusts. The NRA, however, may enjoy other significant
tax advantages through the creation of an irrevocable trust. Whereas
federal income tax laws usually ignore the revocable trust structure
for tax purposes, °4 the Service generally treats the irrevocable trust
as a separate United States taxpaying entity. 05 Through the person
of the trustee, the trust is taxed on all gross income and is allowed
appropriate deductions, e.g., a deduction for amounts distributed. °6
Thus, by serving as a separate taxpayer, the irrevocable trust allows
the accumulation of income or realization of capital gain at United
States tax rates which may be lower than if the trust distributed
income to the beneficiary by other means.10 7
The irrevocable trust also benefits the NRA by allowing the grantor
to pass trust property down along family generations. 108 In this manner
the grantor may avoid paying federal income tax at his own tax rate,
,0, Id. A more complete list of emotional and factual considerations can be found
in Benjamin, Irrevocable Trusts, in USING TRUSTS IN ESTATE PLANNING 71 (N. Crandell
ed. 1969).
102 For a detailed discussion of the advantages of revocable trusts, see supra notes
67-73 and accompanying text.
103 For a detailed discussion of the advantages of conditionally revocable trusts,
see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
-04 For a detailed discussion of federal income tax treatment of revocable trusts,
see supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
,05 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 673, 676 (1982). Because the power of revocation potentially
allows him to receive all of the assets of the trust, the grantor of a revocable trust
is taxed as if the trust structure does not exist. The structure of the irrevocable
trust, however, prevents the grantor from recalling the assets of the trust. Thus,
the grantor of the irrevocable trust does not pay taxes on the income made by the
irrevocable trust. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (husband who
declared himself trustee of certain securities, but retained the right to accumulate
income and complete control over the principal fund, is the owner of the fund and
is taxable thereupon).
106 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 671, 673, 676 (1982).
'o Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 44. The Service imposes a lower tax rate to
the extent that the trust does not distribute its income to the beneficiaries. Id.
108 Id.
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which probably will be higher than the tax rates of his children. 1°9
Furthermore, through the irrevocable trust the NRA can postpone
for an infinite period some generation skipping taxation."10 Therefore,
the NRA may use the irrevocable trust to obtain similar United States
income, gift, estate, and generation skipping tax avoidance and de-
ferral advantages that citizens of the United States enjoy."'
The NRA further benefits in that he may elect to subject his
irrevocable trust to United States income, gift, estate, and generation
skipping tax treatment in the same manner as if he had created a
revocable trust." 2 To obtain revocable tax treatment, the grantor
simply retains at least one rather limited interest or power, while
keeping the trust irrevocable for all practical purposes." 3 Thus, the
NRA may choose from both possible tax worlds, depending upon
the demands of his individual situation.
III. TRUST ADMINISTRATION
After the NRA creates the trust, political, economic, and personal
events may necessitate a change in the trust structure. To facilitate
any future modifications in the trust structure, the NRA should
provide expressly within the trust agreement how and upon what
circumstances such modifications are to occur. Thus, when drafting
the trust agreement, the NRA should include provisions within the
trust instrument that specifically address the possibility of a future
need to change the situs of the trust and/or trust assets or to change
,09 Id. Because the beneficiaries of the irrevocable trust must pay taxes on any
amount received from the trust, the NRA shifts the burden of paying taxes on trust
distributions to his children by naming his children as beneficiaries of the irrevocable
trust. Since the NRA's children generally are in a lower tax bracket than the NRA,
he may save several "tax dollars" through the creation of an irrevocable trust. If
the irrevocable trust accumulates income which it subsequently does not distribute,
however, the trust itself is required to pay income tax on such gain. Id.
1O For a discussion of generation skipping taxation, see supra notes 76-78 and
accompanying text.
Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 44.
12 Id. at 45. For example, the NRA may prefer that the Service tax an irrevocable
insurance trust as if it were revocable so that he may deduct interest paid by the
trust without having to include the trust corpus as gross income. Id.
,,3 Id. For example, the grantor may require that the trustee apply any trust income
to pay the premiums on insurance policies on his life which are owned by the trustee.
Thus, the Service treats the grantor as the owner of the trust property, but he need
not include this property in his gross estate. 26 U.S.C. § 677 (1982). This technique
often is used in insurance trusts. Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 44; see supra note
112 and accompanying text.
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the trustee. Furthermore, the NRA may desire to include within the
trust instrument a provision which addresses the possibility of ter-
mination of the trust.'1 4
A. Changing the Situs of the Trust and/or Trust Assets
When drafting the trust instrument, the NRA should include pro-
visions to govern the transfer of the trust situs and/or assets as well
as the mechanical means of effecting such transfer." 5 Due to the
stability of the United States government and economy, 116 NRA's
generally have omitted change of trust situs provisions in trust in-
struments for United States-situs trusts." 7 The incessant threat of
international conflict, however, demands that the NRA include change
of situs provisions within his trust agreement as a precautionary
measure.
Transfer of trust situs provisions, also referred to as force ma-
jeure,1is "escape" or "flee" clauses," 9 typically are designed to protect
the trust and its assets against the possibility of expropriation or
appropriation of property, political coups, or other similarly disrup-
tive acts of political instability.120 These protective clauses also seek
to prevent the imposition of adverse taxation or exchange or blockage
controls which were not in effect at the time of the trust's creation.,
Finally, transfer provisions also allow a grantor to change trustees
quickly and efficiently. 122
114 Because of the close interrelationships between the trust, its assets, and the
trustee, any change affecting one of these entities necessarily may affect the others.
For example, if the trust situs is changed, the grantor in most situations will need
to find a new trustee to control the trust assets. Despite the interrelationships between
the trust entities, this Note will attempt to address possible modifications of each
entity separately; however, some overlap in the process of discussion is inevitable.
.115 See generally Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.01, at 47-2.
116 For a discussion concerning the desirability of foreign investment in the United
States, see supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
17 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-28.
See Kanter, Special Clauses of Deed Settlement, in FoREIGN TRUSTS IN INTER-
NATIONAL PLANNING 22 (H. Dale comp. 1974). Force majeure, translated from French
to mean a "superior or irresistible power," is defined as an event which results
from the forces of nature, rather than from the acts of human behavior. Force
majeure clauses frequently are found in construction contracts to protect the parties
from non-performance resulting from causes extraneous to the control of the parties
which could not have been avoided through the exercise of due diligence. THE GUIDE
TO AMERICAN LAW 268 (Vol. 5 1984).
119 See Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-25.
120 Kanter, supra note 118, at 22.
121 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-25.
122 Id. For a detailed discussion concerning the change of trustees, see infra notes
139-59 and accompanying text.
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The grantor may affect change of situs by any of of several
methods. For example, the trust instrument may provide that the
transfer of situs is to take effect automatically upon the occurrence
of specified events such as war, nationalization, or the imposition of
exchange controls. 23 The ambiguousness of the terms "war" and
"nationalization", however, may lead to definitional problems. Thus,
automatic transfer of situs provisions are not advisable unless the
draftsman of the trust specifically defines these terms within the trust
instrument. 124
Rather than requiring that the transfer of situs occur automatically
upon the occurrence of certain events, the NRA should provide the
trustee, or a "trust protector,' ' 2 5 or both, with discretionary power
to transfer situs if necessary. 126 If the grantor creates a revocable
,23 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-25. A force majeure clause might read
as follows:
In the event of removal of the Trustee, or in the event of imposition of
exchange control restrictions on currency accounts as may be maintained
for any Trust Fund hereunder, for any other change of circumstances such
as may be caused by war, nationalization or other force majeure which
shall frustrate the purposes of this Settlement ... the Trustee, or, in the
event of inability of the Trustee to so do, then the beneficiary may at any
time or times and from time to time during the Trust Period by Deed
declare that this Settlement shall from the date of such declaration ...
take effect in accordance with the law of some other place . . .[Tihe laws
of the country named in such declaration shall be the laws applicable to
this Settlement and the courts of that place shall be the forum for the
administration thereof but subject to the power conferred by this sub-clause
and until further declaration is made hereunder.
Kanter, supra note 118, at 22-23.
2 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-26. Thus, the trust instrument may
include a provision which specifically defines the terms within the instrument. For
example, the provision may read as follows: "For purposes of this agreement, 'war'
is defined as: hostile contention carried on between, nations, states, or rulers, or
between parties in the same nation or state, the effect of which may endanger the
maintenance and the livelihood of the trust property governed by this agreement."
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1754 (4th ed. 1957).
2 For a discussion of trust protectors, see infra notes 151-55 and accompanying
text.
126 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-26. A transfer of situs provision may
read as follows:
The situs of the trust estate may be transferred to such other place as
the trustee deems it to be for the best interests of the trust estate. In so
doing the trustee may resign and appoint a successor trustee by giving 10
days' written notice to each income beneficiary. The trustee may, however,
remove each successor trustee so appointed and appoint another, including
itself, at will. Each successor trustee so appointed may delegate any and
all trustee powers, discretionary and ministerial, to the appointing trustee
as its agent.
BOGERT, supra note 13, § 1307 (2d ed. 1969).
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trust, he also should provide himself with the power to transfer
situs. 127 A provision which calls for transfer at a party's discretion,
rather than for an automatic transfer, benefits the grantor by allowing
the trust to change situs only after careful deliberation by a party
concerned with the welfare of the trust and its beneficiaries. 12
If the trust agreement does not contain a transfer of situs provision,
a United States court generally will not object to a change in the
trust situs if the court determines that the change will benefit the
administration of the trust or will be in the best interest of the
beneficiaries. 29 Furthermore, some state statutes expressly authorize
the courts to transfer the assets of the trust to a trustee in another
state following a change of trust situs.'30 Several of these statutes
significantly benefit the NRA by allowing the transfer of the trust
to a foreign state. 13 Therefore, even if the grantor does not include
a transfer of situs provision within the trust instrument, he still may
be able to affect a change in trust situs. 3 2 Nevertheless, the NRA
should include a transfer of situs provision within the trust instrument
to avoid costly and time-consuming litigation.
127 Should the grantor decide to establish a revocable trust, he should include
within the trust instrument provisions similar to those included in notes 123 and
126; the draftsman of the provisions, however, should replace "trustee" within the
provisions with "grantor."
128 See generally Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-26.
129 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 861 (2d ed. rev. 1982). For example, a court may
find that it would be advantageous to change the trust situs in order to bring the
trust closer to the trustees or beneficiaries. See In re Weinberger's Trust, 250 N.Y.S.2d
887, 21 A.D.2d 780 (1964) (allowing transfer of the trust since administration of
the trust had become difficult due to the location of the trust assets and the location
of the trustees). Public policy does not prevent a transfer in the absence of contrary
intent on the part of the grantor. Id.; see also In re Henderson's Will, 40 N.J.
Super. 297, 123 A.2d 78 (1956) (application for removal of trust granted where
assets of the trust consisted of cash and securities, no realty was owned by the trust,
and the trust had no business interests in the state).
130 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 19-3-190 to 19-3-192 (1975); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-7201 (1975); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1138.1, 1139-1139.7 (West 1981); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-90 (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.305 (West 1983);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 386.170 (Baldwin 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 204,
§ 3, ch. 206, §§ 29-30 (West 1958); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.835, 706.4-
706.6 (West 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. 164.130 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:23-1 to
3A:23-5 (West 1953); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 725 (Purdon 1975); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 2311 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-64 (repl. vol. 1985).
'3' See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1132, 1139-39.7 (West 1981); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 700.835 (West 1980) (transfer allowed to state of beneficiary's residence
only); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-15 (1984).
32 For a discussion of judicial attitude toward change of trust situs, see supra
note 129 and accompanying text.
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Once the grantor, trustee, or trust 'protector decides to transfer the
trust situs, he must decide upon a location to re-establish the trust.
Since the exigencies of the NRA's situation might demand that a
transfer occur immediately, he should establish a second trust in a
different jurisdiction at the same time that he creates the first trust. 33
This "fallback" trust would have a written provision concerning the
acquisition of the first trust. Such a provision would permit a virtually
automatic transfer of responsibility for administration of the trust
from a politically or economically unstable locale to a more stable
one. 134
Even if the trust instrument does not identify a specific "fallback"
jurisdiction to which the trust may be transferred, the instrument
should provide some limitations on the jurisdiction in which the trust
may be relocated. 135 For instance, the instrument should include a
provision which ensures that the transfer to another jurisdiction will
not result in a violation of the rule against perpetuities. 136 The in-
strument also should include a provision which allows transfer only
to a jurisdiction which will not enlarge or diminish the rights of the
trust beneficiaries to the trust assets. 37 Finally, the instrument should
provide that the jurisdiction in which the trust is relocated will not
impose any restrictions on the investment power of the trustees. 38
By including these provisions within the trust instrument, the NRA
ensures that a change of situs will not change significantly the powers
of the trustee or the rights of the beneficiaries.
B. Changing the Trustee
Following the creation of the trust, the NRA grantor may desire
to change the trustee of the trust. Any one of several reasons may
necessitate a change of trustee. First, the grantor's or a beneficiary's
dissatisfaction with the trustee's exercise of his fiduciary responsi-
133 Kanter, supra note 118, at 23-24; Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-25.
For example, several Bahamian trust companies have organized sister trust companies
or subsidiaries in Jamaica, the Channel Islands, or the Cayman Islands. These
subsidiaries typically maintain records, usually on microfilm, of the trust instrument
and the significant trust accounts. At least one copy of these records is held in
safekeeping in a Swiss, United States, or Canadian bank. Kanter, supra note 118,
at 24.
134 Id.
" See Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04 at 47-27.
136 Id. For a discussion of the rule against perpetuities, see supra note 34.
17 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-27.
138 Id.
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bilities may lead to a disruptive relationship between the trustee and
the grantor and/or the beneficiary.13 9 Second, the possibility of the
trustee's resignation, 14 incapacity, 141 or death, 42 may necessitate a
change of trustee.
Moreover, political, economic, and social changes may require a
transfer of the trust situs, 43 which, in turn, may necessitate a change
of the trustee to ensure efficient management of trust assets.' 4 In
addition, the beneficiary of the trust may move to another jurisdiction,
thus making it difficult, or at least inconvenient, to consult with the
trustee regarding the beneficiary's investment needs and thus neces-
sitating a change of trustee. 45 Finally, the beneficiaries of a trust
may change over time, and a different trustee may be desirable to
take care of the possible changing needs of these "successor-bene-
ficiaries." '46
,39 Kanter, supra note 118, at 25. Compatibility between the trustee and the
beneficiary is significant, especially where the trust agreement provides the trustee
with broad discretionary powers with regard to the investment, distribution, and
accumulation of trust assets. As a practical matter, as more discretionary power is
allotted to the trustee, the possibility of the grantor's or beneficiary's dissatisfaction
with the trustee's exercise of his discretion increases, and thus, the need for a
provision concerning the change of trustees increases. See id.
- See, e.g., Kenady v. Edwards, 134 U.S. 117 (1889). The trustee has the right
to resign his office so long as he uses an established legal mode to do so. Id. at
125. Thus, the trustee cannot resign from his office or from the responsibilities
attached to that office unless such resignation is sanctioned by decree of a court
having jurisdiction in the premises, by a provision within the trust instrument, or
by the consent of all of the trust's beneficiaries who have the capacity to give
consent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 106 (1959).
141 See id. § 107. The court may remove a trustee who becomes bankrupt or
insolvent but is not required to do so. Id. § 107 at comment d. See, e.g., In re
Strasser's Estate, 220 Iowa 194, 262 N.W. 137 (1935) (allowing appointment of
successor trustee where original trust company became insolvent after receiving the
trust).
4I "Upon the death of one of several trustees, the title to the trust property is
in the survivors as trustees." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 103 (1959). "Upon
the death intestate of a sole trustee, the title to the trust property passes subject to
the trust, if realty, to his heir, and, if personalty, to his personal representative,
unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust or by statute." Id. § 104.
"Upon the death of the sole trustee who has devised or bequeathed the trust property,
the title to the trust property passes subject to the trust to the devisee or legatee,
unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust or by statute." Id. § 105.
,3 For a discussion of transfer of trust situs, see supra notes 115-38 and acccom-
panying text.
'- See Kanter, supra note 118, at 26.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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Therefore, when drafting the trust instrument, the NRA may find
it advantageous to include provisions which expressly permit a change
of trustee. When drafting the change in trustee provision, the NRA
must consider how and upon what circumstances such a change is
to occur. 147 For example, similar to the transfer of trust situs pro-
vision,1 41 the trust instrument may provide that the change of trustee
is to take effect automatically upon the occurrence of specified events.
The problems associated with defining "triggering events," however,
indicate that drafting an automatic change of trustee provision may
be very difficult.'
49
Rather than requiring the change of trustee to occur automatically
upon the occurrence of specified events, the NRA should provide
that the grantor or the beneficiary may change trustees at their
individual respective discretion. 50 In addition to giving the grantor
or the beneficiary the discretion to remove the trustee, the NRA also
may give another person acting as a "trust protector" the same
discretion.'' The primary advantage of giving the trust protector such
discretion is that he provides an additional protective element for the
trust. 152 The trust protector acts independently of the trustee, and
therefore, he can protect the trust in situations in which the trustee
in the local jurisdiction may be incapable of acting.' One disadvanage
147 Dale, Protection of Trust Assets, in FOREIGN TRUSTS IN INTERNATIONAL PLAN-
NING I 11, 121 (H. Dale comp. 1974).
,,1 Id. For a discussion of automatic transfer of situs provisions, see supra note
123 and accompanying text.
-,9 For a discussion of the definitional problems of "triggering events," see supra
note 124 and accompanying text.
110 See Dale, supra note 147, at 121. For example, a change of trustee provision
may read as follows: "The beneficiary for the time being of each separate trust
hereunder may remove any trustee thereof with or without cause by delivering to
the said trustee a written instrument signed by such beneficiary PROVIDED that
such written instrument shall concurrently appoint a successor . . . trustee as here-
inafter provided." Kanter, supra note 118, at 27.
,-1 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-27.
152 Id. In many respects the trust protector acts as a "watchdog" on the trustee.
Specifically, the NRA can provide within the trust instrument that the trust protector
will have the powers to remove the trustee and to name a successor trustee, to
approve any investments made by the trustee, to approve distributions of the trust
income and capital, and to transfer the situs of the trust and/or the trust assets to
a new jurisdiction. Id., § 47.04, at 47-29.
"I Id. § 47.04, at 47-27. Thus, the NRA should appoint a trust protector who is
located in a state other than that in which the trustee is located. Furthermore, to
ensure that the trust protector has the best interests of the grantor or the beneficiary
in mind, the trust protector generally should be a close relative or friend of the
grantor or the beneficiary. Id. § 47.04, at 47-29.
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of designating a trust protector, however, is that the trust protector's
commissions may elevate the cost of administering the trust. 5 4 Fur-
thermore, the NRA may be hesitant to provide the trust protector
with such broad powers of discretion and control over the enjoyment
and transfer of the trust, particularly if the trust protector is also a
beneficiary of the trust.'55
If the NRA does not provide expressly within the trust instrument
for a change of trustee, a court of equity may in its discretion remove
a trustee for good cause. 5 6 A court, however, is unlikely to remove
a trustee appointed by the grantor upon a ground known to the
grantor at the time of the trustee's appointment, 5 7 unless such removal
is necessary for the proper administration of the trust. 5 8 Thus, a
court will not discharge a trustee from his office merely for leaving
the jurisdiction of the trust, although a court may justifiably discharge
a trustee where his departure from the trust jurisdiction has interfered
with the administration of the trust. 159 Nevertheless, since litigation
over trust administration may be costly and time consuming, the
NRA should include a provision within the trust agreement which
expressly provides for the change of trustee.
154 Id.
155 Id. Therefore, the NRA may opt to establish a purely advisory trust protector
with whom the trustee is requested, but not required, to confer before taking any
actions which would affect the trust. Id.
136 See, e.g., Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Found., 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 329
P.2d 118 (1958) (diversion of trust funds for unauthorized uses, inefficiency, mis-
management, hostility to beneficiaries, and assumption of an adverse trust are good
grounds for removal of trustee); Boyd v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 145 Tex. 206, 196 S.W.2d
497 (1946) (court may intervene to prevent trust from being devoted to an unau-
thorized purpose and may compel a recusant trustee to act or may remove a faithless
or inactive trustee and appoint another).
'17 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 107 comment f (1959).
I's See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Brown, 436 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. App. 1982)
(removal of trustee held proper where record revealed atmosphere of distrust and
animosity between trustee and beneficiaries); Brown v. Batt, 631 P.2d 1346 (Okla.
App. 1981) (removal of trustee held proper where extreme hostility between trustee
and all beneficiaries had existed from inception of trust and had escalated in intensity).
But see Succession of Noe, 398 So.2d 1173 (La. App. 1981), cert. denied, 405 So.2d
530 (1981) (allegations of hostility which amounted to nothing more than allegations
of social or family animosity or incompatibility were insufficient, without more, to
warrant removal of trustee).
119 E.g., Letcher's Trustee v. German Nat'l Bank, 134 Ky. 24, 119 S.W. 236 (1909)
(court which appoints a trustee has the power to remove her and appoint another
in her stead when she goes out of the jurisdiction of such court); see Blumenstiel
v. Morris, 207 Ark. 244, 180 S.W.2d 107 (1944) (removal of a trustee because of his
absence is in the sound discretion of the trial court).
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C. Terminating the Trust
Finally, the NRA may desire to include within the trust agreement
a provision allowing for the termination of the trust. A trust may
be terminated prior to the expiration of its scheduled term only by
the grantor's exercise of a power of revocation' 60 or by a power of
termination.' 61 The power of termination exists where a party other
than the grantor 162 may close the trust and distribute the trust assets
to the grantor, the beneficiaries, or others, such as creditors or
assignees. 163 A party may exercise the power of termination only in
accordance with a provision within the trust agreement, the acts of
beneficiaries of the trust, or the decree of a court. 64
Generally, implied reservations for trust termination are not avail-
able to the grantor. 165 Thus, the NRA who desires to retain the power
to terminate the trust should provide for such power expressly within
the trust instrument. 166 When drafting the termination of trust pro-
vision, the NRA must consider how and upon which circumstances
the termination is to take effect. For example, the NRA may provide
that termination of the trust will take effect automatically upon the
occurrence of specified events. 67 As in the case of automatic change
'6 For a discussion of revocable trusts, see supra notes 64-85 and accompanying
text.
363 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 998 (2d ed. rev. 1983).
362 Generally, any termination of the trust by the grantor is viewed as a revocation
of the trust. When the grantor is the sole beneficiary of the trust, however, he can
compel the termination of the trust, even if the purposes of the trust have not been
fully accomplished and regardless of whether the trust is revocable, conditionally
revocable, or irrevocable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 339 (1959).
363 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 998 (2d ed. rev. 1983).
' Id. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
365 Nevertheless, a few state statutes allow the grantor to revoke the trust by notice
to the trustee unless the trust was expressly made irrevocable. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2280 (West 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.41 (West 1971); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.051 (Vernon 1984). Most state statutes, however, provide
that a trust is irrevocable unless expressly made revocable. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 53-12-3 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2041 (West 1981); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-23-502 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.560 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §
59-02-18 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 55-3-6 (1980).
'6 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 1000 (2d ed. rev. 1983).
167 An automatic termination clause may read as follows:
In the event that [state condition, such as: war is declared by or upon
the nation in which said trust is located], trustee may terminate such trust
and distribute the principal and any accrued or undistributed net income
of such trust [specify distributee(s), such as: to the income beneficiary of
such trust].
AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS (SECOND) REVISED § 251.475 (1984).
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of situs and automatic change of trustee provisions, however, au-
tomatic termination of trust provisions generally are not desirable.' 61
Rather than requiring that the trust terminate upon the occurrence
of specified events, the NRA should provide expressly within the
trust instrument that the trustee, beneficiary, or trust protector, or
a combination of all three, shall have the power to terminate the
trust at their individual respective discretion.' 69 Furthermore, the NRA
should provide expressly for the method by which the power of
termination is to be exercised. 170 However, if the termination provision
does not specify the procedure for termination, most courts probably
168 For a discussion of the undesirability of automatic change of situs and automatic
change of trustee provisions, see supra notes 123-24, 148-49 and accompanying text.
169 BOGERT, supra note 13, § 1000 (2d ed. rev. 1983). Even though by giving the
trustee and/or the trust protector the power to authorize distribution of the trust
assets to the beneficiaries, the grantor empowers the trustee and/or the trust protector
to terminate the trust partially, such authority does not allow the trustee and/or
the trust protector to transfer all the trust principal at one time, thereby terminating
the trust. See Jordon v. Campbell, 19 N.C. App. 97, 198 S.E.2d 96 (1973), cert.
denied, 283 N.C. 753, 198 S.E.2d 722 (1973); Buchanan v. Paterson, 188 N.Y.S.2d
161, 159 N.E.2d 661 (1959); see also BOGERT, supra note 13, § 1000 (2d ed. rev.
1983). When drafting the termination of trust provision, the NRA might use the
following clause:
[specify party(ies) to have power of termination, such as: The benefi-
ciaries] of this trust shall be entitled to terminate the trust in whole or in
part at any time on delivery to trustee of a written demand signed by [all]
of the then beneficiaries. Trustee shall then pay the trust estate, together
with its accumulations, or the part thereof for which demand is made, to
the then beneficiaries.
AM. JUR. LEGAL FoRMs (SECOND) REVISED § 251.473 (1984).
If the NRA decides to use a trust protector to "watch over" the trust, he may
want to include the following provision:
Beneficiaries [or whomever the grantor wishes to designate] shall have
the right, on due demand therefor by instrument in writing filed with trustee
and with consent in writing of [trust protector], to terminate this trust.
Thereupon, the trust property then in trustee's possession shall be distributed
to beneficiaries.
Id. § 251.474.
110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 (1959). See, e.g., Gamage v.
Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 598 S.W.2d 463 (Ky. App. 1980) (when a trust
instrument expressly provides for a specific method of revocation, the grantor must
comply with the expressed method for the revocation to be effective); Funk v. Funk,
24 Wash. App. 19, 598 P.2d 792 (1979) (when a trust agreement specifies the method
of revocation, only the expressed method may be utilized to revoke the trust);
Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 136 Cal. Rptr. 60, 66 Cal. App. 3d 399 (1977)
(trust not revoked effectively where the trust instrument expressly provided for
revocation by written, notarized notice to the trustee signed by both the grantor
and her attorney, but the grantor actually sent to the trustee a written statement
which had not been notarized nor signed by the grantor's attorney).
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will allow any reasonable procedure.' 7' Most courts also will allow
a termination which the grantor did not reserve expressly within the
trust instrument, if the circumstances demand such a revocation.7 2
Once the trust is terminated, whether by the expiration of its fixed
term, revocation, by court decree, or otherwise, the trust continues
to operate for a reasonable time.7 3 During this time the trustee has
the authority and responsibility to perform those acts which are
appropriate for the "winding up" of the trust. 7 4 When winding up
the trust, the trustee continues to protect and preserve the trust
property and, in some circumstances, may convert the trust property
to cash for distribution to the trust beneficiaries.7 5 The trustee,
however, may not make new and permanent investments without
prior approval of the beneficiaries unless such investments are con-
nected directly with the winding up of the trust and distribution of
the assets to the beneficiaries.' 76
171 See, e.g., In re Estate of Craft, 320 So.2d 874 (Fla. App. 1975) (a new trust
agreement, which provided for the object and subject matter of the trust, as well
as a subsequent letter confirmation, was sufficient to revoke a prior trust); In re
Gifford Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 769, 9 Pa. Fiduc. 631 (1959) (where no method
of revoking a revocable trust is set forth in the instrument, the trust may be revoked
informally and orally without consulting the trustee).
172 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 336 (1959). "If owing to circumstances
not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him the continuance of the trust
would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust, the court will direct or permit the termination of the trust." Id.
173 See, e.g., American Cancer Soc'y v. Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. App.
1981) (trustee not liable for postponing distribution of the trust assets beyond
termination where litigation involving the trustee was pending); Cogdell v. Fort
Worth Nat'l Bank, 537 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1976) (trustee not liable for postponing
distribution of trust assets beyond termination when trust was involved in litigation
at the time of termination).
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 344 (1959). The trustee has the responsibility
to wind up the administration of the trust with reasonable care and prudence.
BOGERT, supra note 13, § 1010 (2d ed. rev. 1983).
'7" Id. If the trustee delays in making distributions upon the termination of the
trust, he may be held liable for interest. In re Ducker's Will, 161 N.Y.S.2d 549, 3
A.D.2d 852, reargument denied, 164 N.Y.S.2d 995, 3 A.D.2d 937 (1957) (interest
was assessed where trustee unreasonably delayed in accounting and in paying over
trust funds). But see Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Roan,
617 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980) (trustee not liable for failure to convey the trust
property promptly upon termination where there had been protracted negotiations
regarding the proper distribution of trust assets among various beneficiaries).
176 McBride v. McBride, 262 Ky. 452, 90 S.W.2d 736 (1936) (upon termination
of the trust, the duty of the trustee to persons beneficially entitled is to take
appropriate steps for winding up the estate by making distributions, and thereupon
the power to make further investments ordinarily ceases).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the properly planned and managed failsafe trust offers
the NRA several attractive benefits, the effectiveness of this investment
device for the protection of assets from local and foreign governmental
action is still a matter for conjecture.'7 Ultimately, the NRA must
assess several subjective and factual considerations to determine whether
a failsafe trust will serve effectively his investment needs.'17 If he
decides to establish a failsafe trust, the NRA must then determine
how to structure this device so as to meet these needs.
Although the United States provides the NRA with a politically
and economically secure investment situs,' 7 9 expert management for
the trust,'80 and several tax advantages,' the NRA probably will
benefit more from a trust situated in a foreign situs. Despite the
political stability of the United States, the United States government
has a history of involvement, either directly or indirectly, in the
political conflicts of other nations. Thus, ironically, the occurrence
of a home country political emergency could prevent the NRA grantor
from benefiting from a United States investment device which he
structured in anticipation of such an occurrence.18 2
To ensure the security of his investment, the NRA must select
carefully the proper foreign situs for the trust.' 3 By situating the
trust in one of several "tax havens,"'' 8 the NRA will protect best
his investment needs. Before selecting a particular tax haven in which
to situate the trust, however, the NRA should'thoroughly investigate
this country.' 5 For example, it is essential that the NRA examine
177 Wyckoff, supra note 3, § 47.04, at 47-25.
17, For a discussion of the relevant factors which may be significant in determining
whether to establish a failsafe trust, see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
179 For a discussion concerning the desirability of investment in the United States,
see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
1s For a discussion of the advantages of management by a United States trustee,
see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
8I For a discussion of the tax advantages provided within the United States, see
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
112 Knight, supra note 7, at 114.
"I3 For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages associated with a foreign-
situs trust, see supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
,84 For a discussion of tax havens, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
,83 A. STARCHILD, TAX HAVENS 24 (1979). In particular, the NRA should investigate
the charges imposed by the country for maintenance of the trust, the flexibility of
the corporate structure within the country, exchange controls and monetary freedom
within the country, accessibility to and around the country, professional services
within the country, and the possibility for local business activities within the country.
Id. at 25-28.
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the past and current political and social developments within the
country. 116 Although some jurisdictions may be undesirable for the
creation of the trust, several tax havens exist which are secure eco-
nomically and politically and which appear to remain secure in the
future. 11
7
Once he selects the trust situs, the NRA also may encounter dif-
ficulty in deciding whether to select a revocable, conditionally re-
vocable, or irrevocable trust. Although the NRA receives the best
tax advantages through the irrevocable trust, 88 the conditionally re-
vocable trust'89 probably presents the most effective protection against
home country expropriation or United States freezing. Once the NRA
creates an irrevocable trust, he forfeits all personal power over the
trust,' 90 thus making it difficult to prevent expropriations. Similarly,
the NRA may be powerless to prevent expropriation of assets within
a revocable trust if a political emergency occurs within his home
country. By creating a conditionally revocable trust and by providing
for a trust protector situated in another country with discretionary
power to transfer the situs of the trust, 9' the NRA best maintains
the opportunity to prevent expropriation of his trust property.
When drafting the trust agreement, the NRA also should include
provisions concerning the transfer of situs, the change of trustee,
and the termination of the trust. Ambiguity in defining the events
which would trigger an automatic modification indicates that auto-
matic transfer of situs, change of trustee, and termination of trust
provisions are undesirable. 92 Thus, to ensure efficient and expedient
6 Id. at 28-31.
A country that is involved in a civil war, or that regularly changes
governments "by bullet," or that has a strong socialist political faction is
hardly to be trusted to keep investment assets secure. A political upheaval,
or even a change in legislation introducing taxes or other restrictions on
corporations or trusts, may take away everything.
Id. at 29.
- Examples of such tax havens include the Bahamas, Barbadoes, Bermuda (despite
past political tensions), the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica,
Hong Kong, Liberia, Liechtenstein, and Netherlands Antilles. Id. at 225-46.
1"8 For a discussion of the tax advantages associated with irrevocable trusts, see
supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
119 For a discussion of conditionally revocable trusts, see supra notes 86-92 and
accompanying text.
-9 For a discussion of the limitations of the irrevocable trust, see supra notes 93,
99 and accompanying text.
,9, For a discussion of trust protectors, see supra notes 151-55 and accompanying
text.
,92 For a discussion of automatic provisions, see supra notes 123-24, 148-49, 167-
68 and accompanying text.
19871
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
modifications, the NRA should provide that any change or transfer
will take effect at the discretion of the grantor, the beneficiary, the
trustee, a trust protector, or a combination of these parties. 193 Such
discretionary provisions ensure that a transfer or change will occur
at the discretion of a party acting for the benefit of the trust and
its beneficiaries.
In summary, the NRA will serve best his investment needs by
creating a conditionally revocable, foreign-situs trust located within
a politically secure tax haven. Furthermore, the trust agreement for
this investment structure should include several precautionary pro-
visions which will enable the trust to adapt to future events. 94 The
NRA, however, should realize that little can be done, excepting normal
legal procedures, to protect property actually located in a country
which is subject to a political emergency. 95 Therefore, if the NRA
is concerned about the political or economic stability of a particular
country, he should maintain as few assets as possible within that
country to avoid seizure of his property. 196
Furthermore, timing is of the essence for the NRA wishing to invest
abroad. The NRA should investigate thoroughly the countries in which
he wishes to situate his investment structures so that he may predict
with some degree of certainty the events of the future. The NRA's
safest investment plan would be to disburse his assets into several
different investment devices within several different countries. Thus,
the NRA might create one or more United States-situs trusts as well
as one or more foreign-situs trusts. The trust instruments for these
trusts would include provisions which would allow for a countless
number of trust situs, assets situs, and trustee changes, as well as
for the potential termination of the trust. 197 By maintaining his in-
vestments in several devices and jurisdictions, the NRA ensures that
a single political or economic catastrophe will not lead to a depletion
of his entire estate.
Andrew H. Prussack
193 For a discussion of discretionary provisions, see supra notes 125-28, 150-55,
169-72.
- Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 46.
191 Kanter, supra note 118, at 24.
196 Id.
19 Hendrickson, supra note 26, at 46.
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